Perspective

Market Review:

While Q1 held the potential for uncertainty around the path of the Federal Reserve’s interest rate decisions, many were caught off guard by the events that transpired over the last three months. Unexpected developments such as the second largest bank failure in US history, the demise of Credit Suisse, a 167-year-old Swiss financial institution, and the Treasury volatility index rising to the highest level since 2008, all failed to stop risk assets from posting positive gains during the quarter.

One of the key performance drivers for the quarter was duration, with long duration assets posting the best performance among risk assets. Over the course of the first quarter, the 2-year yield dropped 40bp, the 10-year yield was down 41bp and the 30-year yield declined 31bp. Additionally, the rates market saw the largest 2-10-year inversion since 1981 occur on March 7th, only for the 2s-10s curve to steepen by 65bp a few days later. Even prior to interest rate “March Madness”, the rate market saw plenty of volatility in January and February. January saw a sharp rate rally on the back of a benign December CPI report that showed ex-shelter core inflation to be decelerating, causing market participants to bet on a Fed pivot in the 2nd half of 2023. This view was further encouraged by Fed Chairman Jerome Powell’s comments following the February 1st FOMC meeting. Powell stressed that the economy was running hot, employment conditions remain tight, and he would be carefully watching payroll data to assess the impact of cumulative rate hikes. Shortly thereafter, the January blockbuster payroll report reversed the narrative that the Fed would pivot on rates in the 2nd half of 2023. Suddenly, it was not a question of whether the Fed would hike rates at its March meeting, but whether they would raise rates by 25bp or 50bp.

The January CPI report also came in above expectations, bolstering views that the Fed had a lot of work left to do on the inflation front. The 2-year yield increased by almost 100bp to over 5.00% and the curve flattened by 40bp, with prominent economists calling for a 6% Fed Fund’s rate.

March brought the unexpected failure of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), the 2nd largest bank failure in US history, with $209 billion assets on the balance sheet. The failure was spurred by an unsuccessful equity raise that was necessitated by large deposit withdrawals from technology companies. SVB’s run on uninsured deposits exposed the bank’s inadequate asset-liability management and a duration mismatch between long-term assets and short-term deposits. The sudden run on deposits at banks with large losses in their Held-to-Maturity (HTM) portfolios, stemming from the rapid rise in interest rates, combined to cause a bank panic not seen since the Global Financial Crisis. By the time regulators came up with a solution, the Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP), another large regional bank Signature Bank, with over $100 billion in assets, was forced to be taken over by the FDIC, representing the 3rd largest bank failure in US history. The BTFP, which included generous lending terms by the Fed, allowed banks to receive funding at par for discount Treasury and Agency MBS collateral, along with an increased Fed discount lending window and a verbal commitment to essentially guarantee all deposits, which helped stabilize all risk assets while causing dramatic gyrations on the short end of the curve. A forced takeover of Credit Suisse, by its Swiss rival UBS, a week later only added to rate volatility with the MOVE index rising to 200, a level not seen since 2008.

The 2-year note posted a move of at least +/-20bp for seven consecutive days in March before ending the quarter at 4.02. The market shifted its expectations from 4 additional rate hikes* in 2023 just prior to SVB to 3 rate cuts** by the end of January 2024 after the March FOMC meeting when the Fed hiked rates by 25bp.

Corporate credit indices posted positive returns in Q1, with IG Corporates gaining 3.50% and HY Corporates up 3.57%. IG Corporates returns were due to duration and carry, as the OAS widened by 6bp in Q1. The IG Corporate credit curve remained relatively unchanged with no noticeable difference in performance between rating categories. IG banking and financial issues underperformed other corporate sectors following the fallout of SVB. HY Corporates posted a 1.23% excess return relative to Treasuries in Q1 as HY spreads tightened by 28bp. The HY market was again aided by low new issue supply, with only $40 billion of HY issuance, the lowest volume in 7 years. The Fed’s swift actions following SVB’s failure, along with expectations of the Fed taking its foot off the pedal on rate hikes, helped drive HY spreads tighter. The HY Credit curve flattened with CCCs and Bs outperforming BB credits. The Bloomberg Aggregate index posted a gain of 2.96%.

Source: https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/bfb2023.html

RMBS:

The RMBS sector continues to benefit from robust credit fundamentals. The February Core Logic Home Price Index (HPI) increased 4% year-over-year and is only 3% below its 2022 peak. The inventory of available homes remains low by historical standards, but has a distinctly regional component as the Sunbelt and West Coast are showing a rise in availability. Rental growth remains robust but is decelerating, as the Zillow nationwide rental index is up 6.3% year-over-year but down 0.5% from its Q3 2022 high. We expect rents to increase higher relative to mortgage payments as it is more economic to rent in 98% of MSAs. As a result of continuing strong HPA, borrower delinquencies are reaching rock bottom levels, with 60+ day delinquency rates reaching 1.5% in February and Non-Agency 60+ day delinquency rates declined to 5.9% from 7.7% a year ago.

RMBS sectors underperformed their fixed income credit counterparts in Q1 on a spread basis as liquidity dried up in March amidst bouts of extreme rate volatility. Mortgage bond funds saw approximately $20 billion in net outflows during March and thus, more limited demand resulting in spreads leaking slightly wider for the quarter. The Non-QM sector, which includes the securitizations of loans that don’t qualify for Agency MBS, continued to see the largest amount of new issue supply at $8.6 billion in Q1 and now makes up just under 10% of all Non-Agency RMBS. Non-QM also accounted for the vast majority of the $35 billion of Non-Agency RMBS that traded in secondary markets during the quarter. Demand for low dollar Non-QM tranches from 2021 and 2022 heated up in January as rates dropped and money managers searched for yield with a significant amount of price upside (positive convexity). Senior AAA tranches saw spreads tighten to 150bp before a sell-off in February, combined with net fund outflows in March, pushed spreads on AAAs back to 185bp. On-the-run Non-QM AA and A Mezzanine passthrough tranches finished the quarter at spreads of 230bp and 270bp, which is 10-20bp tighter relative to the start of the quarter. Legacy RMBS (Non-Agency RMBS issued prior to the Great Financial Crisis) saw a limited amount of trading as most accounts preferred to sell bonds in other sectors to meet any redemptions. Many money managers and hedge funds that have been traditionally active in Legacy RMBS space have continued to face marginal redemptions, which has hampered their ability to take advantage of relatively widespread levels available in Legacy RMBS. Long spread duration senior and mezzanine subprime floaters have been clearing in low-to-mid 300bp spread levels. Similar kind of spread levels were seen in Prime/Alt-A Hybrids, while fixed-rate bonds saw slightly tighter prints at spreads of 275-300bp as real money accounts could not pass up on the predictable carry, positive convexity, and minimal credit risk of Legacy RMBS.

*Source: Bloomberg as of March 9, 2023
**Source: Bloomberg as of March 23, 2023

CMBS:

CMBS was the exception to the otherwise positive performance of risk assets during Q1 and had the misfortune of becoming one of the financial scapegoats during the bank panic. Even before the collapse of SVB, investors were feeling apprehensive about the future Commercial Real Estate (CRE) maturity wall. With close to $450 billion of CRE loans set to mature in 2023 and $168 billion of that in CMBS, questions were being asked about how these loans would be refinanced following a 300bp rise in funding costs.

Additionally, about 30% of upcoming CMBS maturities are concentrated in the office sector, which is facing structural headwinds from the post-Covid work-from-home (WFH) environment. The office sector saw vacancy rates rise as companies continue to reduce their footprint due to WFH and additionally, rental rates declined by 1.6% year-over-year. Of particular concern are older suburban buildings in secondary and tertiary locations and office buildings in tech-centered hubs like San Francisco and Seattle.

Following the collapse of SVB and the ensuing regional bank panic, CMBS spreads widened as trading essentially halted and liquidity evaporated. Regional banks have become instrumental in providing funding to the CRE market, accounting for 27% of lending volume in 2022. Thus, the likely tightening of lending standards by regional and community banks are seen as major headwinds for the CRE and CMBS markets over the next few years. For the quarter, AAA Last Cash Flow (LCF) spreads reached 183bp, 53bps wider year-to-date while BBB- on-the-run bonds saw spreads widen to 980bp. To put this in perspective, LCF AAA CMBS spreads have averaged under 100bp over the past 10 years (including the pandemic-related dislocation in 2020) and are now also historically wide relative to A-rated Corporates while BBB- CMBS spreads are much higher than BB and B rated HY Corporates.

The two key credit metrics for evaluating CRE loans collateralizing CMBS are Loan-to-Value (LTV) and the Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR). LTV is the loan amount divided by the property’s value. 1-LTV is the amount of equity the borrower/sponsor has in the property. A lower LTV implies that the borrower/sponsor has more equity in the loan (i.e. more “skin in the game”), aligning their interests with creditors, while higher LTVs result in higher default probabilities and greater likelihood for losses. DSCR indicates the ability to cover debt service, thus avoiding default. DSCR > 1.0x indicates that cash flow more than covers debt service. Within the CMBS structure, credit enhancements can prevent losses on the underlying CRE collateral from flowing through to the CMBS bondholder. Therefore, although certain property types of CRE appear to be under economic stress, that does not necessarily imply credit losses on CMBS, particularly higher-rated tranches with significant credit enhancement. In fact, over time since the GFC, loss rates on CRE loans have been trending lower because CMBS underwriting standards have been consistently improving. Specifically, LTVs have been dropping and DSCRs have been rising. In addition, rating agencies have been requiring greater credit enhancement on investment grade tranches. For instance, the percent of high LTV loans (i.e., >70%) has decreased from over 55% in 2007 to almost 0% in 2022. Similarly, DSCR has increased over 115% since 2007 moving from 1.3x to 2.8x in 2022. Finally, credit enhancement on AA and BBB CMBS Conduit tranches increased 60% (10% to 16%) and 123% (3% to 7%), respectively.

ABS:

ABS new issue supply declined 11% from Q1 2022, which contributed to the continuation of the tightening trend that began in December. Spreads on AAA and BBB subprime autos settled in at 100bp and 275bp, respectively. Market Place Lending (MPL) spreads declined by 25bp to 175bp for AAAs and 425bp for BBBs. Investors feel confident about structural protections offered by these ABS sectors where there are multiple lines of defense against collateral losses (excess spread, subordination, reserve accounts, etc.). From a fundamental credit point view, we continue to see performance deterioration across both prime and subprime credit tiers for both auto and MPL collateral. Prime and subprime auto losses and delinquencies have risen to levels seen prior to Covid-19, after being suppressed during the pandemic due to record fiscal stimulus. The one area of concern is the credit performance of subprime MPL collateral where annualized losses have been pushed to record highs. The main argument for the rapid rise in losses in subprime MPL collateral is the exhaustion of excess savings among low-income earners due to inflation. However, it is reassuring that household debt as a percentage of GDP has fallen for eight straight quarters and is below 75% for the first time since 2001. Additionally, debt service as a percent of income has declined to the lowest level in 20 years. The fault lines for low-income earners are clearly expressed in the steepness of BB/B curve in subprime auto and MPL with BB/B subprime auto at 750/1150bp and BB/B MPLs at 800/1200bp.

CLOs:

CLO spreads tightened marginally in Q1 with the bulk of outperformance coming in January as real money accounts put money to work as expectations of a Fed pivot rose. Spreads widened in February as the risk of a hard landing took hold of the market. Spreads continued their upward ascent in March before the Federal Reserve, along with other regulatory bodies, calmed market fears with a comprehensive package to help shore up bank balance sheets and stem the outflow of deposits. For the quarter, CLO spreads tightened between 10 and 20bp, depending on the credit tier, leaving AAA spreads, for example, at 175bp. The issuance of Broadly Syndicated Loans (BSL) CLOs fell 6% compared to Q1 2022, while Middle Market (MM) CLO issuance doubled. The Leveraged Loan index posted a 1-point increase in price to 93.44. Despite marginal outperformance relative to IG Corporates, CLO spreads remain wide compared to IG Corporates on a historical basis. Defaults and CCC shares in CLO space continued to rise with loan defaults increasing to 1.32% in Q1. According to S&P Leveraged Loan research, loan defaults could increase to 2.5% by the end of 2023 as tighter credit conditions, manifested by high interest rates, continue to put stress on weaker corporate issuers.* One comforting statistic for the leveraged loan market is that unlike CMBS, only about 5% of loan maturities will take place by the end of 2024 so there is still time for issuers to pursue various refinancing options.

Structured Notes:

Q1 was marginally positive for Corporate Structured Notes as the swap yield curve steepened by 10bp between 2s and 30s, rates rallied, and corporate OAS tightened slightly for larger banks. Lower multiple Constant Maturity Swap (CMS) floaters rallied into the 60s on the back of a strong demand for discount bonds that have yields in excess of 6% despite zero coupons. Higher multiple Morgan Stanley issued CMS floaters have been trading in the mid-60s to mid-70s depending on the multiple and maturity. Credit Suisse issued CMS floaters underperformed in Q1 due to credit concerns surrounding their forced sale to UBS.

Q1 2023 Portfolio Attribution and Net Return

Sector	Allocation	Net return*	Attribution
RMBS	44.3%	2.23%	0.99%
CMBS	21.0%	1.73%	0.36%
ABS	6.6%	4.15%	0.27%
CLO/CDO	7.5%	-0.92%	-0.07%
CORP	13.2%	-0.76%	-0.10%
GOVT	3.3%	4.18%	0.14%
Cash	4.2%	0.46%	0.02%
Total	100.0%		1.61%

Source: Ultimus Fund Solutions, Orange Investment Advisors
Performance and attribution shown is the Orange Investment Advisers, LLC (“the Firm”) composite in USD for the period shown. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Actual fees may vary depending on, among other things, the applicable fee schedule and portfolio size. Investment management fees are available in the Firm’s Form ADV on www.sec.gov. The Firm claims compliance with the GIPS® standards; this information is supplemental to the GIPS® report provided at the end of the presentation. Returns greater than one year are annualized.

Portfolio Attribution and Activity:

The Structured Credit Value composite returned 1.99% gross of fees (1.61% next of fees) for the quarter, while the Bloomberg Aggregate Index returned 2.96%. The difference was primarily attributable to the portfolio having a lower duration relative to the index (1.98 years vs 6.12 yearrs) in a period where rates rallied significantly. Main contributors to return were RMBS, CMBS, and ABS while CLOs, CDOs, and Corps were slightly negative. Trust Preferred Securities (TruPS) CDOs saw 25-50bp spread widening in Q1 following the regional banking crisis and potential issues with a few underlying credits (Signature Bank). Our Trups CDO holdings did not have any exposure to Signature Bank, but 2ndand 3rd pay tranches dropped 5-10 points in Q1 due to negative headlines and lack of liquidity. A couple of our middle market CLO positions saw downward price revisions and that offset the carry from our CLO allocation, which now makes up only 2.7% of portfolio. Given the lack of convexity once prices reach the high 90s, we trimmed our CLO position by selling a few CLO senior and subordinate tranches in the upper 90s while picking up similar yields and better convexity in RMBS and CMBS bonds at lower dollar prices. Despite spread widening across the credit spectrum, our 21% CMBS allocation managed to produce a positive return in Q1 due to its favorable carry. We were quite active during the quarter, repositioning the portfolio to take advantage of numerous investment and trading opportunities we saw across RMBS and CMBS which stemmed from account transitions and liquidations where sellers were likely acting on non-economic motives.

Outlook:

We believe the best Structured Credit investment opportunities lie within the CMBS and Legacy RMBS sectors. CMBS is battling negative headlines, which include higher interest rates that make refinancing current loans difficult amidst declining property values, secular issues confronting the office sector, and a lack of financing options amidst a regional banking crisis. These negative headlines have stressed the CMBS market with current holders not adding to existing positions and potential investors waiting for more distress in the CRE market as the economy is set to enter a long-awaited recession. We have seen older vintage (2012-2015) AA and A rated bonds trading close to a 10% yield as the market assigns very harsh maturity extension scenarios to underlying loans. Newly issued BBB tranches are clearing above 11% despite having collateral underwritten at lower LTVs than more seasoned deals. Finally, seasoned Small Balance Commercial subordinate tranches can be bought at 10-11% yields despite having a significant percentage of multifamily collateral and having structural protection against collateral losses in the form of excess coupon spread in addition to subordination. fund redemptions with net inflows seemingly going into corporate sectors. Lack of sponsorship has created great buying opportunities as low loan count hybrid passthroughs are trading above 8% yield and into the double-digits for odd-lot pieces. The Legacy RMBS market is also suffering a buyers’ strike as

long-time Legacy RMBS holders have been facing ongoing fund redemptions with net inflows seemingly going into corporate sectors. Lack of sponsorship has created great buying opportunities as low loan count hybrid passthroughs are trading above 8% yield and into the double-digits for odd-lot pieces.

The portfolio now yields 8.7% (gross of expenses), has an average dollar price of $80 with an effective duration of 2.0 years and spread duration of 3.6 years as of Q1 2023. By contrast, the Bloomberg Aggregate Index has a 4.4% yield and an average dollar price of $91 with effective duration of 6.3 years and spread duration of 6.3 years. We believe that Structured Credit sectors offers higher yield and lower duration risk than traditional fixed income for a number of reasons. While the Aggregate index has a high credit quality due to a large portion being composed of Treasuries and Agency MBS, within the credit portion of the Agg (i.e. Corporates), Structured Credit bonds arguably have more credit protection for a given credit rating than Corporate bonds, while typically providing more yield. Another reason contributing to the relative value of Structured Credit stems from the fact that it is outside the Aggregate Index and therefore not subject to the persistent demand of passive index investors and Index ETFs. We also believe it is unfamiliar to a large number of investors relative to traditional index fixed income sectors, which causes it to be under-represented in fixed income portfolios, further contributing to its relative value. A focused Structured Credit strategy managed by an experienced manager can provide access to the opportunities presented by the securitized debt market.

3/31/2023

Sector	Allocation	Price	Yield	Eff Dur	Sprd Dur
RMBS	44.6%	80.3%	8.5%	2.2	3.9
CMBS	21.2%	85.1%	11.9%	1.6	2.6
ABS	6.1%	94.1%	9.1%	1.3	2.6
CLO/CDO	5.8%	64.7%	12.4%	0.4	3.2
CORP	12.9%	64.8%	6.1%	2.0	7.2
GOVT	3.7%	100.5%	3.5%	8.2	0.0
Cash	5.8%	100.0%	3.5%	0.0	0.0
Total	100%	$80.1	8.7%	2.0	3.6
Blbg Agg		91.1	4.4%	6.3	6.3

Source: Ultimus Fund Solutions, Orange Investment Advisors
Portfolio allocations are an average of the period shown; all other information is as at the date 3/31/2023. Allocations are subject to change at any time, are based on a representative portfolio, and may differ, sometimes significantly, from individual client portfolios.

GIPS Report

Structured Credit Value Strategy Composite

Year	Composite Gross Return	Composite Actual net Return TWR (%)	Composite Model Net Return TWR (5%)	Benchmark Return (%)	Composite Gross 3-Yr St Dev (%)	Benchmark 3-Yr St Dev (%)	Number of Portfolios	Internal Dispersion (%)	Composite Assets ($M)	Firm Assets ($M)
2022	-4.85%	-6.27%	-5.47%	-13.01%	5.88%	5.85%	1	N/A	$327.74	$526.47
2021	6.36%	4.79%	5.67%	-1.54%	5.36%	3.40%	1	N/A	$294.19	$422.61
2020	15.74%	14.05%	15.00%	7.51%	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	$193.05	$274.65
2019	8.92%	7.31%	8.21%	8.72%	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	$39.74	$39.74
2018*	1.96%	1.46%	1.74%	0.98%	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	$35.76	$35.76

*Represents a partial year of performance

Orange Investment Advisors is a Fixed income investment manager that invests primarily in U.S.-based Structured Credit securities. Orange Investment Advisors is defined as an independent investment management firm that is not affiliated with any parent organization. Policies for valuing investments, calculating performance, and preparing GIPS reports are available upon request.

Orange Investment Advisors claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. Orange Investment Advisors has been independently verified for the periods August 1, 2018 through December 31, 2021. The verification report is available upon request. A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedures for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm’s policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firmwide basis. Verification does not provide assurance on the accuracy of any specific performance report.

The Structured Credit Value Strategy Composite includes all fee paying SMAs and Funds that invest in Structured Credit based on Orange’s Active Value Security Selection approach which is a bottom-up, value-based investment strategy. The strategy seeks to provide a high level of income and total return with low sensitivity to interest rates and credit spreads by taking advantage of opportunities in the inefficient and non-indexed structured credit market. Derivatives, including options, futures, and swaps, and short positions may be used, primarily for hedging or managing certain risks, including interest or credit spread risk. The account minimum for the composite is $1 million.

The benchmark for the composite is the Barclays Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Total Return Index. Index returns reflect the reinvestment of income, but do not include any expenses, such as transaction costs and management fees.

Valuations are computed and performance is reported in U.S. dollars.

Returns include the reinvestment of income and are presented gross and net of fees. Gross returns are net of transaction costs. Actual net returns are net of actual transaction costs, management fees, as well as other fund operating fees and expenses. Model net returns are supplemental to actual net returns and are calculated by reducing the monthly composite gross return by a model fee of 0.05417%, which equates to an annual model fee of 0.65%, the highest fee charged to any SMA client. Actual fees may vary depending on, among other things, the applicable fee schedule and portfolio size. The firm’s fees are available upon request and also may be found in the firm’s Form ADV Brochure. The standard annual fee schedule is: 0.65% on the first $100 million, 0.55% on the next $150 million, and 0.45% on all assets above $250 million under management.

This composite was created in July 2021, and the inception date is September 1, 2018. A list of composite descriptions and a list of limited distribution pooled funds are available upon request.

Internal dispersion is calculated using the equal-weighted standard deviation of annual gross returns of those portfolios that were included in the composite for the entire year. It is not presented (“N/A”) when there are five or fewer portfolios in the composite for the entire year.

The three-year annualized standard deviation measures the variability of the composite gross returns and the benchmark returns over the preceding 36-month period.

Past performance does not guarantee future results.

GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein.

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